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Abstract
& Neuropsychological studies with patients suffering from
prosopagnosia have provided the main evidence for the
hypothesis that the recognition of faces and objects rely on
distinct mechanisms. Yet doubts remain, and it has been
argued that no case demonstrating an unequivocal dissocia-
tion between face and object recognition exists due in part to
the lack of appropriate response time measurements (Gauthier
et al., 1999). We tested seven developmental prosopagnosics
to measure their accuracy and reaction times with multiple
tests of face recognition and compared this with a larger bat-
tery of object recognition tests. For our systematic compar-
ison, we used an old/new recognition memory paradigm
involving memory tests for cars, tools, guns, horses, natural
scenes, and houses in addition to two separate tests for faces.
Developmental prosopagnosic subjects performed very
poorly with the face memory tests as expected. Four of the
seven prosopagnosics showed a very strong dissociation
between the face and object tests. Systematic comparison of
reaction time measurements for all tests indicates that the
dissociations cannot be accounted for by differences in reaction
times. Contrary to an account based on speed accuracy
tradeoffs, prosopagnosics were systematically faster in nonface
tests than in face tests. Thus, our findings demonstrate that
face and nonface recognition can dissociate over a wide range
of testing conditions. This is further support for the hypothe-
sis that face and nonface recognition relies on separate mech-
anisms and that developmental prosopagnosia constitutes a
disorder separate from developmental agnosia. &
INTRODUCTION
Over the last 20 years, a number of neuropsychological
cases have shown dissociations between impaired face
recognition and normal or relatively spared nonface
recognition (Henke, Schwinbuerger, Grigo, Klos, &
Sommer, 1998; Farah, Levinson, & Klein, 1995; Farah,
Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1995; McNeil & Warrington,
1993; De Renzi, 1986). These cases have provided crucial
support for the hypothesis that face recognition relies
on different mechanisms than nonface recognition.
However, the failure to measure response time in these
cases leaves open the possibility that speed–accuracy
tradeoffs can account for these accuracy dissociations
(Gauthier, Behrmann, & Tarr, 1999), and it has been
argued that no unequivocal cases have been docu-
mented that show impaired face recognition with nor-
mal nonface recognition. Herein, we discuss the results
of testing that we have done with a relatively large
sample of developmental prosopagnosics (DPs) that
aims to determine whether face recognition and nonface
recognition can dissociate.
Developmental Prosopagnosia
Until the last few years, nearly all of the prosopagnosics
documented in research articles acquired their face
recognition impairments as adults due to trauma, stroke,
or degenerative disease. In the comprehensive review of
agnosia by Farah (1990), she listed approximately 80
cases of acquired prosopagnosia. At the time, there were
only two reports of individuals who did not acquire
prosopagnosia as adults (Tranel & Damasio, 1989;
McConachie, 1976). Recently, however, a number of ar-
ticles have documented such individuals (Duchaine,
Dingle, Butterworth, & Nakayama, 2004; Barton, Cher-
kasova, Press, Intrilligator, & O’Connor, 2003; Duchaine,
Nieminen-von Wendt, New, & Kulomaki, 2003; Duch-
aine, Parker, & Nakayama, 2003; Hasson, Avidan,
Deouell, Bentin, & Malach, 2003; Michelon & Bieder-
man, 2003; Pietz, Ebeinger, & Rating, 2003; Jones &
Tranel, 2001; Laeng & Caviness, 2001; Nunn, Postma, &
Pearson, 2001; de Gelder & Rouw, 2000; Duchaine,
2000; Farah, Rabinowitz, Quinn, & Liu, 2000; Bentin,
Deouell, & Soroker, 1999; de Haan, 1999). Rather than
losing mature face recognition abilities, these individuals
failed to develop the face recognition skills seen in most
adults. These individuals have been most commonly
referred to as DPs, and they hold great promise for
understanding the computational, developmental, and
genetic mechanisms involved with face recognition. Harvard University
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uals after they responded to our web site that discusses
our research on prosopagnosia (www.faceblind.org). In
the 2 years since we set up our web site, we have been
contacted by more than 175 self-reported prosopagno-
sics. Few of these individuals were aware of any inci-
dents that could have caused their impairment, so it
appears that, contrary to the proportions in the litera-
ture, most cases of prosopagnosia are not the result of
brain damage sustained during adult years but rather
result from an anomalous developmental course.
DP has been used to refer to individuals whose
prosopagnosia is due to a genetic condition (Duchaine,
Nieminen-von Wendt, et al., 2003; Bentin et al., 1999; de
Haan, 1999), brain damage (both prenatal and during
childhood) (Barton et al., 2003; Michelon & Biederman,
2003; Farah et al., 2000), and unknown causes. Living
with DP can be very difficult. Some DPs are able to man-
age fairly well in social situations, but many prefer to limit
their social activities to avoid placing themselves in sit-
uations in which person recognition is necessary. The
following quote comes from an email written to one of
the authors by a DP:
I think prosopagnosia has worsened my current
depression, if not been a root cause of it. This
condition always affects my ability to form normal
social links to others. I prefer to be a recluse because
I can’t confidently function any other way. My
avoidance of people (to interact with socially) is
nearly phobic.
Many compensate by relying on information other
than facial structure, and the most commonly reported
alternative routes to identification include hair, clothing,
voice, and gait (Barton et al., 2003; Duchaine, Nieminen-
von Wendt, et al., 2003; Nunn et al., 2001; Duchaine,
2000). When these means fail, DPs often use conversa-
tional topics to determine identity. Because face recog-
nition usually occurs almost instantaneously, these less
reliable and slower methods often are not sufficient to
successfully manage social situations. Some individuals
with face recognition impairments have been diagnosed
with autism or Asperger syndrome (Duchaine,Nieminen-
von Wendt, et al., 2003; Blair, Frith, Smith, Abell, &
Cipolotti, 2002; Cipolotti, Robinson, Blair, & Frith, 1999;
Davies, Bishop, Manstead, & Tantam, 1994), whereas
others appear to be socially typical aside from their
problems with face perception. In addition, a sizeable
proportion of DPs who have contacted us report severe
navigational impairments (Duchaine, Parker, et al., 2003)
and a number have been diagnosed with central auditory
processing deficit, which is characterized by difficulty
understanding speechinnoisy settings (Duchaine,2000).
Interestingly, many DPs do not identify their disorder
until well into adulthood (Duchaine, Parker, et al., 2003;
Laeng & Caviness, 2001; Duchaine, 2000). There are
probably a few factors that contribute to this surprising
lack of awareness. First, unlike prosopagnosia acquired
in adulthood, DPs are not able to compare their im-
paired abilities to previously normal abilities. In addi-
tion, DPs often develop refined abilities to use other
methods of identification. Finally, a number of DPs have
mentioned asking relatives about person recognition,
only to be told that everyone has trouble with it.
However, family members are likely to be an unreliable
source in this regard, because approximately 20% of the
respondents to our web site report relatives with face
recognition problems and we have confirmed it in three
families (Duchaine, Nieminen-von Wendt, et al., 2003;
see also de Haan, 1999). That intelligent people can be
unaware of an impairment to an ability as critical as face
recognition hints that many people may have perceptual
or cognitive blind spots that are never identified.
The Development of Face Perception
We mentioned above a number of precipitating causes
that can lead to developmental prosopagnosia, but we
have little understanding how these factors affect the
development of face processing abilities. Gaining such
an understanding is challenging, because the develop-
ment of face perception involves a number of mecha-
nisms and the acquisition of mature face perception
skills is not complete until late adolescence (Mondloch,
Le Grand, & Maurer, 2002; Carey, Diamond, & Woods,
1980). Infants are born equipped with mechanisms, pos-
sibly subcortical, that direct attention to faces (Johnson,
Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991; Goren, Sarty, & Wu,
1975), and experiments have shown that they engage in
sophisticated face processing early in life. Newborns can
recognize their mother’s face via the external features
(Pascalis, de Schonen, Morton, deRurelle, & Fabre-
Grenet, 1995; Bushnell, Sai, & Mullin, 1982), and by
8 weeks, they begin to use the internal features as well
(Blass & Camp, 2004). In addition to facial identity, work
has shown that infants make fine discriminations for
facial attractiveness (Slater, Bremner, Slater, & Mason,
2000; Slater et al. 1998), facial expressions (Field et al.,
1982; see also work in macaques, Sackett, 1966), and eye
gaze direction (Blass & Camp, 2001).
Object recognition typically involves feature process-
ing (Biederman, 1987), but face recognition also involves
holistic processing and configural processing (McKone,
Martini, & Nakayama, 2001; Freire, Lee, & Symons, 2000;
Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987).
Holistic processing is characterized by the integration
of facial information into a gestalt (Tanaka & Farah, 1993;
Young et al., 1987), whereas configural processing usu-
ally describes sensitivity to the precise spatial layout
of the facial features (Freire et al., 2000; Diamond &
Carey, 1986) or features in the context of a facial image
(McKone et al., 2001; Tanaka & Farah, 1993). Some evi-
dence indicates that the mechanisms which carry out
these computations are dissociable neuropsychologically
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tally (Carey & Diamond, 1994; Mondloch et al., 2002),
and behaviorally (Freire & Lee, 2000; Le Grand et al.,
2001), though recent behavioral and neuroimaging work
has questioned this conclusion (Yovel & Kanwisher,
in press). Feature processing and holistic processing
appear to operate at an early age (Carey & Diamond,
1994; Tanaka et al., 1998), but the age at which configural
processing emerges is unclear. Some studies indicate
that configural processing does not reach adult levels
until adolescence (Carey and Diamond, 1994; Mondloch
et al., 2002), but this has been challenged by findings
showing that the inversion effect does not increase after
age eight (Itier & Taylor, 2004). Interestingly, although
face recognition continues to improve throughout child-
hood (Carey & Diamond, 1994; Mondloch et al., 2002), it
does not reach adult-levels without visual input to the
right hemisphere during the first six months of life
(Le Grand et al., 2001; 2003).
This brief review makes it clear that there are many
possible ways that such a complex and protracted
process could be disrupted. An absence of normal input
to right hemisphere mechanisms could arise for any
number of reasons: lack of social contact, failure to
direct attention to faces, or low-level visual problems
such as infantile cataracts, severe uncorrected myopia,
or amblyopia in which input from the left eye is sup-
pressed. The many cortical recognition mechanisms
involved with face recognition could fail to develop
due to environmental factors, genetic deficits, or brain
damage anytime during development. Except in cases
of brain damage (Michelon & Biederman, 2003; Laeng &
Caviness, 2001; Farah et al., 2000) or visual deprivation
(Le Grand et al., 2001, 2003), it is difficult to determine
the factors contributing to abnormal development af-
ter difficulty with faces has become apparent. One prom-
ising approach lies in longitudinal studies of children
who are more likely to develop prosopagnosia such as
those with limited early visual input, posterior brain
damage, or a family history of prosopagnosia.
Abilities Other Than Face Recognition in
Developmental Prosopagnosia
A small number of case studies have investigated visual
recognition abilities other than face identification in DP,
and these reports have shown that some DPs are im-
paired with other abilities, whereas some are normal
(see Galaburda & Duchaine, 2003, for a review). This
mixed outcome is true for recognition of facial expres-
sions of emotion, age discrimination, and sex discrimi-
nation. Similarly, nonface object and place recognition
has been shown to be impaired in some DPs, whereas
others appear to show normal recognition of at least
some nonface classes (Duchaine, Nieminen-von Wendt,
et al., 2003; Nunn et al., 2001; Bentin et al., 1999). The
heterogeneity that has been found for these different
abilities is similar to that found with individuals with
acquired prosopagnosia (Galaburda & Duchaine, 2003).
Our web site has allowed us to study a relatively large
number of DPs, and we are investigating a range of
abilities to better understand this array of conditions.
Our testing is addressing DP’s low- and midlevel percep-
tual abilities, recognition of identity, expressions of emo-
tion, attractiveness, and sex via the face, and the neural
basis of their processing impairments. Herein, we will
focus on their recognition of items from nonface classes.
Nonface Discrimination and Issues in
Prosopagnosia
Tests of nonface recognition in DPs enable us to address
a number of important questions regarding the mecha-
nisms of visual recognition. First, are the recognition
impairments of DPs restricted to tasks involving faces
or do they also include other classes? A number of case
studies have addressed this question in acquired proso-
pagnosia (Gauthier et al., 1999; Henke et al., 1998; Farah,
Levinson, etal.,1995,Farah,Wilson,etal.,1995;McNeil &
Warrington, 1993), but the nonface recognition abilities
have only been formally tested in a few DPs (Duchaine,
Nieminen-von Wendt, et al., 2003; Jones & Tranel, 2001;
Nunn et al., 2001). If our testing shows that these DPs
are impaired with faces and comparable nonface catego-
ries, this is consistent with the existence of a single rec-
ognition mechanism that is used for face and nonface
discriminations (Tarr & Cheng, 2003). However, if face
recognition and nonface recognition rely on different
mechanisms (at least in normal subjects), there may be
DP individuals who show dissociations between face
and nonface discrimination. Note that the existence of
separate mechanisms does not predict that all DPs will
show dissociations between face and nonface recog-
nition but only that some will. Neuroimaging studies
indicate that face and nonface recognition involve over-
lapping brain areas (Grill-Spector, 2003; Haxby et al.,
2001; Kanwisher, 2000), so it seems quite likely that these
abilities, if they are separable, will rely on many com-
mon developmental processes, which, when anomalous,
will often affect both types of recognition. In addition,
there may be computational mechanisms that are used
for recognizing both faces and nonfaces.
If the single mechanism account is correct, prosopag-
nosia and agnosia are not distinct conditions. Although
there has been general agreement that prosopagnosia is
a discrete condition since Bodamer (1947) first charac-
terized it, a review by Gauthier et al. (1999) questioned
this classification. The review found that although there
were accuracy results showing impaired face recognition
coupled with normal or relatively spared nonface recog-
nition (Nunn et al., 2001; Bentin et al., 1999; Henke et al.,
1998; Farah, Levinson, et al., 1995; Farah, Wilson, et al.,
1995; McNeil & Warrington, 1993), response time was
almost never measured so speed/accuracy tradeoffs may
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suggested that subjects may have responded very slowly
to test items in the putatively normal nonface tests and
this allowed these subjects to pull their scores into the
normal range. Given such long time intervals, such
individuals could have used special strategies to perform
the task that have little to do with normal object re-
cognition. Thus, they argue that there has never been a
case of showing an unequivocal dissociation between
face and nonface recognition, and so Gauthier et al. cast
doubt on the idea that prosopagnosia actually exists as
a separate entity from agnosia.
Our results will better address the issues discussed
above than past reports for three reasons. First, no DP
samples of this size have been tested before. Second, we
will measure response time to determine if speed/accu-
racy tradeoffs may account for any dissociations that we
may find. Lastly, we will test nonface discrimination with
far more classes than is typically used. In past reports,
one or two nonface classes were typically used whereas
we will use six nonface classes.
The results of our testing will also provide insight into
the developmental processes that construct mechanisms
of object recognition. Dissociations in acquired prosop-
agnosiareveal little about development, because damage
occurs after recognition abilities have fully matured. In
contrast, DPs were unable to develop normal face
recognition abilities so normal abilities with other visual
classes would suggest that the underlying mechanisms
are built, at least in part, by different developmental pro-
cesses. In addition, poor face recognition with normal
object recognition would demonstrate that functioning
object mechanisms cannot compensate for the impaired
mechanisms normally used with faces (Farah, Wilson,
et al., 1995). Finally, past studies of abilities other than
facial identity have indicated that DP is not a homoge-
neous condition (Galaburda & Duchaine, 2003). Testing
our relatively large sample of DPs with identical tests
allows us to directly address this issue.
RESULTS
All of the following tests used the old/new recognition
memory paradigm described in the Methods section.
During the study phase of the experiment, subjects were
instructed to memorize the target images, and then they
attempted to discriminate between the target images
andthenontargetimagesinthetestphase.Sevenprosop-
agnosics were included in our DP sample. As discussed
in the Methods section, these individuals reported
severe face recognition problems in everyday life. Each
scored more than 2 standard deviations below the con-
trol mean on at least three of four tests of face recog-
nition. We labeled the DPs by sex (F or M) and number.
The 17 control participants were graduate students
without extensive experience in perceptual experiments.
Each control participant produced a score for each old/
new test except for four instances out of a possible 136
(17 controls   8 tests). Examples of the stimuli from the
different categories used in the experiments below can
be seen in Figure 1.
We used A
0 as the measure of discrimination in the
following comparisons. It is a bias-free measure that
varies between 0.5 and 1.0 with higher scores indicating
better discrimination (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991).
Unlike d
0, A
0 values can be computed when cells with
zero responses are present. To estimate the standard
error for each subject for each test, we performed a
bootstrap analysis, resampling 1000 times from the data
set of each DP and each control subject. This provides us
with an estimate of the standard deviation in their A
0
scores (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). The simulations used
random sampling with replacement from within sets of
target and nontarget test trials.
Face Discrimination
Because performance with objects will be assessed with
old/new tests, it is necessary to confirm that our DPs are
severely impaired with faces in this paradigm. We used
two face discriminations to assess their performance,
and the tests were identical except that each used a dif-
ferent set of 40 faces. The symbols in Figure 2 show
the individual A
0 scores for each DP and each control
subject for the two face tests. In this and subsequent
graphs, each DP is identified by a distinct colored
symbol (men in blue, women in pink). The nonoverlap-
Figure 1. Items from the old/new discrimination tests.
252 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 17, Number 2ping cluster of the individual DP scores confirms that
they are severely impaired with faces.
Nonface Discriminations
Figure 3 shows the distribution of A
0 scores for each
DP and control subject for the nonface discriminations.
To better display the relative performance of each DP
subject with respect to the control population, scores
are ordered according to performance. Each DP is
uniquely identified as described above. It is clear that
for a few of the nonface discriminations the DP subjects
were amongst the poorest performers. This is most
evident for cars and guns where the worst performing
subjects were the DPs and the better performing DPs
were mostly confined to the bottom half of the normal
sample. From this pattern of results, it suggests that
some DP subjects in our sample are likely to be agnosic
with a broad pattern of recognition disabilities.
However, for many of the nonface tests, A
0 scores for
the DPs are scattered over the normal range. Two DPs
scored within the normal range on all of the nonface tests
(see scores of M1 and M2), one scored in the low end of
the normal range in all of the tests (F2) and one scored
within the normal range for all but one test (M3). A
majority of the DPs scored in the normal range on the
tools,horses,scenes, and houses tests.There were a total
of38 nonface A
0 scores for the DPs, and 22 of these scores
were within 1.5 standard deviations of the control mean.
As such, it looks like for this group of 7 subjects, there
is considerable heterogeneity, some subjects seem to
show what looks like normal object recognition while
having severe deficits in face processing. This is particu-
larly evident for the three male DP subjects who hap-
pened to perform especially badly at the faces task (see
blue symbols in Figure 2). If a single recognition mech-
anism is used to recognize all classes of stimuli, then
these subjects, performing so poorly on the face tasks,
should be the poorest performers in the object tasks as
well. This is clearly not the case, indicating that there is
indeed a dissociation between face and object processing
in a significant number of our prosopagnosic subjects.
To address this point more systematically, we con-
structed a simple linear model, making the assumption
that face and nonface perception require the same
abilities. If this were the case, performance on face dis-
crimination tasks should provide an unbiased estimate
for performance on the nonface discriminations. If true,
it would strongly support Gauthier et al.’s (1999) im-
plication that prosopagnosia does not constitute a dis-
order separate from agnosia. On the other hand, if
nonface recognition performance was superior to that
predicted, we would have to conclude that at least in
some individuals, there is a dissociation between face
and nonface processing. We constructed the simple
linear model as follows. First, we estimated the relative
difficulty of each test (Tj) by computing the average
performance of the control subjects. Next, we used the
performance of all subjects on Faces 1 and Faces 2 to
estimate their recognition ability (Ai). Using these two
variables, test difficulty (Tj) and general recognition
ability (Ai), we predicted performance on all other tests
as expressed in Equation 1:
Pij ¼ Ti þ Aj ð1Þ
where the performance (Pij) of the ith subject on the
jth test is simply the sum of these factors.
Expressing these as A
0 scores leads to a separate plot
for each test with each point representing predicted
versus observed performance of each subject (see
Figure 4). Not surprisingly, these predictions are born
out by the scores of the faces tests shown on the top
two panels where they hug the 458 diagonal line pre-
diction. Of greater interest is the pattern of results for
the nonface tests. First let us consider the normal con-
trols on all of the tests (open circles). They do not de-
viate systematically from the 458 identity line. As such,
the face tests provide an unbiased estimate of the per-
formance on the nonface tests of the control subjects.
Of greatest interest is the pattern of data obtained
from the prosopagnosic subjects (colored symbols). The
three male subjects (in blue) all fall well above the
diagonal line, indicating that they are performing far
superior in each of these nonface tasks than predicted
by their face scores. Female F2 (solid pink circle) fits
into this category as well for all tests but one, cars. The
scores of the other subjects (the three remaining wom-
en in pink) straddle the 458 line with half the scores
above and half below this line. These subjects therefore
cannot be regarded as prosopagnosic only but also as
Figure 2. A
0 scores for DPs (colored shapes) and control subjects
(open circles) on the two face old–new discriminations
(Faces 1 and Faces 2). Each DP is identified with individual symbols
(pink symbols = women, blue symbols = men) and numbers. These
symbols remain the same in Figures 2–5.
Duchaine and Nakayama 253Figure 3. Individual distribution of simulated A
0 produced by bootstrapping analysis for nonface old/new discriminations. Scores have been sorted
from low to high so that the rank of individual DPs is apparent. Error bars represent 1 standard deviation.
254 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 17, Number 2agnosic. From these findings, we conclude that about
half (4) the subjects are candidates for the designation
of selective prosopagnosia, insofar they have deficits in
face perception with normal abilities for other catego-
ries. Essentially, all of their object scores are well above
that predicted from their abilities inferred from their
face scores. Three of the subjects, on the other hand,
cannot be regarded as purely prosopagnosic, because
they have deficits with nonface classes.
Can Face Selective Processing be Explained by
Slow Reaction Times on Nonface Items?
One of the main points of Gauthier et al. (1999) is that
accuracy scores by themselves can be misleading. For
example, it is possible that putative cases with face-
specific prosopagnosia could spend a disproportionate
amount of time with nonface tasks, perhaps adopting
some kind of alternative strategy and thus elevating
their score. Gauthier et al. point out that in the literature
describing prosopagnosia there are few systematic re-
ports of reaction times (RTs) for face and nonface tasks.
Thus, longer opportunities to process nonface classes
could explain their better abilities with these classes.
This may be especially true for perceptual tasks in which
piecemeal comparison of features is possible (Duchaine
& Weidenfeld, 2003).
We can test for this possibility by examining RTs for all
subjects on all tests. If so-called prosopagnosic subjects
were to adopt this strategy, then their RTs to nonface
Figure 4. Plots displaying predicted A
0 scores and observed A
0 scores for control subjects (open circles) and DPs if the same mechanism was used
to perform all of the discriminations. Predicted scores were generated by measuring subjects’ ability with the face tests and then predicting their
score by subtracting their ability from the difficulty of the test. If symbols are above the diagonal line, the observed score was greater than the
predicted score; if below, the observed score was lower than predicted score.
Duchaine and Nakayama 255tests should be disproportionately long, especially in
comparison to the RTs for faces. The table in the
Appendix shows the RTs for all prosopagnosic and
normal subjects. From this table, it is clear that a number
of the DP’s RTs are out of the normal range. What is
important, however, is to determine whether the pro-
sopagnosic subjects’ RTs are disproportionately long for
n o n - f a c e si nc o m p a r i s o nt of a c e s .T oe v a l u a t et h i s
possibility, in Figure 5 we plot the relative slowness of
RT of the prosopagnosic subjects on faces (the abscissa)
versus the relative RTs responding to nonface classes (in
z score units derived from the normal controls). If pro-
sopagnosic subjects are spending disproportionately
more time with nonfaces than faces on tests each point
on Figure 5 should be above the 458 line of equivalence.
This is clearly not the case. Ninety five percent of the RT
scores are below this 458 line, indicating that prosopag-
nosia subjects do not spend a disproportionate amount
of time looking at nonface objects as suggested by
Gauthier et al. (1999), but do just the opposite. Prosop-
agnosic patients, as might be expected from their con-
dition, are spending a disproportionate amount of time
examining faces. Of the 22 A
0 scores in the normal range,
only two (F2-Houses; F4-Houses) had RT z values that
were lower than the average of the z values from these
subjects’ RTs for the two face discriminations. As such,
speed–accuracy tradeoffs cannot account for the disso-
ciations seen with our prosopagnosic subjects. In fact, if
speed–accuracy tradeoffs were operating, they lessened
the number and magnitude of the dissociations in our A
0
results.
Note also that these dissociations cannot be ex-
plained by differential difficulty explanations (Gloning
et al., 1970). Such explanations point out that if general-
purpose mechanisms were impaired, the impairment to
the mechanisms would first be evident in particularly
difficult discriminations. Because faces are a complex
stimulus with high within-class similarity, it could be
that face discriminations are simply more difficult than
nonface discriminations. However, the average A
0 for
the control subjects with faces was higher than their
average A
0 scores with cars, guns, tools, and horses, and
the average A
0 scores for faces were nearly identical to
those for houses and scenes (see Figure 4). As a result,
differential difficulty cannot account for the observed
dissociations.
DISCUSSION
After demonstrating that seven DPs showed significant
impairments in two separate old/new recognition mem-
ory tests with faces, we tested their nonface discrimina-
tion with six additional tests, each containing distinct
categories of visual objects. If visual recognition is per-
formed by a single mechanism (Tarr & Cheng, 2003),
the DPs should show impairments that are comparable
to their impairments with faces. In contrast, if face
recognition is performed by mechanisms different from
those involved with other types of object recognition,
then some of the DPs may show normal or relatively
spared performance with the nonface categories.
We found clear dissociations between face and object
recognition in four of the seven DPs. All were very
impaired in multiple tests of face recognition but were
not comparably impaired in the many tests with the
other object classes. This indicates that these catego-
ries are, in fact, handled by different mechanisms. Our
RT measures showed that long latencies cannot be
responsible for these dissociations. In fact, our results
went in the opposite direction predicted by such an
account. Because we found dissociations in more than
half of our seven subjects, it appears that dissociations
of this type are not outliers but could be fairly typical in
Figure 5. Comparison of z score values for normalized response
times for face and nonface tests for each prosopagnosic subject on the
old/new discriminations. Large negative values indicate RTs much
longer than the control mean RT. Note that the axes have been
reversed. Each subject is represented by a particular color. The open
symbol for each subject represents the average of that subject’s z
scores for Faces 1 and Faces 2. The filled symbols represent z scores
for the response times for the nonface tests. Each DP’s RT values are
vertically aligned so that response times on the different tests can be
compared (the x value of every point is the face value for that DP).
Nonface values that are above the diagonal are further from the control
mean than the face value is, whereas values below the diagonal are
closer to the control mean than the face value is (and oftentimes in
the normal range). Speed–accuracy tradeoffs cannot account for a
dissociation between impaired face discrimination and normal nonface
discrimination if the nonface response time z score is closer to the
mean than the face response time z score.
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2001; Bentin et al., 1999).
The results are consistent with results from a number
of sources, which indicate that faces are processed
differently than other classes of visual stimuli. Case
studies have shown a number of individuals who show
dissociations between face and nonface classes (Nunn
et al., 2001; Henke et al., 1998; Farah, Levinson, et al.
1995; Farah, Wilson, et al., 1995), but the lack of RT mea-
sures has placed these reports in question. We found
that RTs tend to be longest for prosopagnosics when
confronted with face tasks so it seems likely that at least
some of the earlier dissociations seen in acquired pro-
sopagnosics were indeed dissociations between face and
nonface recognition. Complementing these cases of pro-
sopagnosia are case studies demonstrating that the
converse dissociation, spared face recognition with se-
vere object agnosia, can also exist (McMullen, Fisk, &
Phillips, 2000; Humphreys & Rumiati, 1998; Moscovitch,
Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997). In addition to case studies,
neuroimaging (Kanwisher, 2000; McCarthy, Puce, Gore,
& Allison, 1996), neurophysiology (Kreiman, Koch, &
Fried, 2000; Gross, Rocha-Miranda, & Bender, 1972), and
psychophysics (McKone et al., 2001; Tanaka & Farah,
1993; Young et al., 1987) all provide evidence that faces
and objects are processed by different mechanisms.
Many hypotheses have attempted to characterize the
domain of the recognition mechanisms used to process
faces (Gauthier et al., 1999; Moscovitch et al., 1997;
Farah, 1991; Levine & Calvanio, 1989; Diamond & Carey,
1986), but past cases of prosopagnosia and our current
study do not provide a definitive answer.
The results also speak to the issue of classification of
individuals with visual recognition impairments. Despite
performing extremely poorly with faces in terms of
accuracy and response time, many of our DPs were able
to score in the normal range on nonface discriminations.
Even more impressively, a few of the DPs (M1, M2, and
F2) scored in the normal range on most or all of the
nonface tasks. This demonstrates that prosopagnosia is
not invariably accompanied by general agnosia. As a re-
sult, it appears that prosopagnosia is a condition that is
distinct from agnosia. This conclusion is also powerfully
reinforced by reports of agnosia without prosopagnosia
(McMullen et al., 2000; Humphreys & Rumiati, 1998;
Moscovitch et al., 1997).
The dissociations seen in our sample are not only neu-
ropsychological dissociations but also developmental
dissociations. Individuals with these dissociations were
unable to develop normal face processing, but they de-
veloped normal or near-normal abilities with some non-
face classes. As a result, these results along with other
developmental dissociations indicate that mechanisms
used for face recognition and those used for nonface
recognition are not constructed by the same develop-
mental process (Duchaine, Nieminen-von Wendt, et al.,
2003; Nunn et al., 2001; Bentin et al., 1999). These data
do not yet allow us to make inferences about the nature
of these dissociable developmental processes, but large
numbers of selective cases of developmental agnosia
should provide insight into these divisions (Duchaine,
Nieminen-von Wendt, et al., 2003).
Unfortunately, the subject histories of these DPs and
their experimental results do not hint at the develop-
mental point at which the division between face and
object recognition first emerges in the brain. Based on
a case of putatively selective prosopagnosia due to brain
damage the day after birth, Farah et al. (2000) argued
that the division exists before any postnatal experience.
This notion is consistent with evidence indicating that
the development of configural processing involves a
right hemisphere mechanism with an early critical peri-
od (Le Grand et al., 2001, 2003). However, the evidence
for such an early distinction is sketchy, and future
studies with DPs should shed light on this issue.
The picture emerging from studies of DP suggests
that it is a quite heterogeneous condition. Not only
do DPs vary quantitatively in their abilities with face
recognition and their neural responses to faces (Hasson
et al., 2003; Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 2002), but they also
show qualitatively different patterns of performance
with other visual tasks. The DPs reported on here
showed widely varying abilities with nonface categories,
and as mentioned above, DPs have manifested normal
and impaired abilities with many tasks other than rec-
ognition of facial identity (Galaburda & Duchaine,
2003). Because a substantial and growing number of
DPs are involved with research, this heterogeneity offers
a promising means to characterize the mechanisms
giving rise to face and object recognition.
METHODS
Participants
Eleven individuals who reported difficulties with face
recognition made up our initial sample of DPs, and
most of these individuals contacted our laboratory
through our web site (www.faceblind.org). All com-
plained of significant problems with face recognition in
everyday life, and all recounted numerous experiences
in which they were unable to recognize individuals
after exposure that would be expected to lead to recog-
nition in neurologically typical people. Many of these
individuals also reported that they regularly recognized
strangers as familiar. They ranged in age from 21 to 44,
and all were in good health. Despite their impairments
with visual recognition, some of these DPs have fairly
normal professional and social lives, but their impair-
ments are certainly troubling at times and sometimes
cause great difficulties.
To determine whether these subjects were actually
impaired with face recognition, they were tested with
the Face One in Ten (OIT) and a test of famous face
Duchaine and Nakayama 257recognition. The OIT requires subjects to discriminate
between a target individual and nontarget faces despite
radically changing illumination. Three different target
individuals are used, and the results from 400 trials are
used to compute d
0, a measure of accuracy, and average
RT. The test is discussed in detail elsewhere (Duchaine,
Nieminen-von Wendt, et al., 2003; Duchaine, 2000). In
the famous face test, subjects were presented with
images of celebrities from entertainment and politics
cropped so that little hair or clothing was visible. Two dif-
ferent versions were used, one with 25 faces (Duchaine,
Nieminen-von Wendt, et al., 2003; Duchaine, 2000) and
one with 60 faces.
We dropped three individuals from our initial DP
group, because their scores on the OIT, famous faces,
and the two face old/new discriminations presented in
the Results section did not conclusively demonstrate
impairment with face recognition. We also dropped
another individual, because he had difficulties with face
categorization tasks (‘‘Is this a face?’’). This indicates
that his face recognition impairments are due to mech-
anisms operating before recognition mechanisms, and
so his results may not shed light on the operation of
mechanisms used for the recognition of individual faces.
Five of the remaining seven individuals were out of
the normal range on all four tests for either accuracy,
response time, or both. The other two subjects (F3 and
F4) were more than 2 standard deviations worse than
the control participants on three of the four tests (see
Figure 6), and the exception for both subjects was on
the famous face test. However, both subjects were still
more than 1.5 standard deviations below the mean with
the famous faces. F3 has been discussed in a paper
documenting her impaired facial identity recognition
coupled with her normal recognition of facial expres-
sions of emotion. M3’s face and nonface discrimination
was reported on in another article (Duchaine, Nieminen-
von Wendt, et al., 2003), and we included his results
here to compare more DPs in a single study. Information
about each subject is provided in Table 1. All of these
individuals performed normally on the perceptual tests
in Birmingham Object Recognition Battery (Riddoch &
Humphreys, 1993) and had no difficulty recognizing
common objects drawn from Snodgrass and Vander-
wart’s (1980) corpus of line drawings. Individuals listed
ashavinglikelygeneticetiologieshaveparentsorchildren
with significant face recognition difficulties.
Seventeen graduate students (9 women and 8 men)
served as control participants for the old/new recogni-
tion memory tests, and their mean age was 27.8 with a
range from 24 to 34. The control results showed no
significant sex differences for any of the tests, and in fact,
the means for each sex were extremely similar. Control
subjects for the Face OIT were 13 undergraduate and
graduate students. Control subjects for the famous faces
tests were age-matched for the DPs, and each famous
face control sample consisted of 15 or more subjects. All
control participants and prosopagnosics participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli
In each old/new recognition memory test, 40 items from
within a category were used. Ten items were target
items, and they were shown during the study phase of
the experiment. Thirty items were nontargets that were
presented along with the target items during the test
phase. See Figure 1 for examples.
Faces 1 and Faces 2
Grayscale yearbook photographs of women’s faces were
cropped so that very little or no hair was visible. To
achieve a standard pose, some of the images were
flipped or rotated. All of the images were the same size.
Figure 6. z Scores for the DPs on the OIT and famous faces test,
which contributed to our determination that a subject was actually a
DP. In addition to these tests, we used performance on the two face
old/new discrimination tests. The A
0 scores for the face old/new tests
are displayed in Figure 2 and the RTs are displayed in Figure 5.
Table 1. Information on DP Subjects
DP Subject Age Occupation Probable Etiology
F1 22 Researcher Unknown
F2 44 Teacher Unknown
F3 40 Teacher Genetic
F4 43 Fitness instructor Genetic
M1 21 Teacher Genetic
M2 22 Student Unknown
M3 41 Engineer Genetic
Individuals listed as having genetic etiologies have parents or children
with significant face recognition difficulties.
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The cars used in these grayscale photographs had all
conspicuous ornaments removed, and were placed on a
white background facing the same direction. Each car
was categorized into one of three styles (compact,
sedan, or truck), and they were divided proportionally
into targets and nontargets. The sizes of the cars were
adjusted so that they were the proper size relative to the
other cars.
Tools
Eight tool images were drawn from five categories (saws,
hammers, pliers, wrenches, and screwdrivers), and these
grayscale items were presented on a white background.
Two items from each category were chosen as targets,
and all items from particular categories were presented
with a similar orientation and size.
Guns
Color images of handguns were used. All conspicuous
decorations were erased, and the guns were presented
in the same orientation and were scaled similarly.
Horses
The stimuli for this test consisted of color photographs
of model horses made by Breyer Animal Creations
placed on a white background. The photographs pre-
sented a side view of the horses, and their poses and
sizes were similar.
Natural Landscapes
Grayscale photographs of natural landscapes that did
not have any manmade structures were used. Eight
landscapes were used from each of the following five
categories: beaches, lakes, meadows, mountains, and
deserts. Two images were chosen from each category
to serve as targets. All images were the same size.
Houses
The color photographs used in this test contained
typical looking houses photographed from the front
with some of the yard surrounding the house visible.
The sizes of the images were similar.
Procedure
Subjects were tested individually in a normally lit room,
and were seated approximately 40 cm from the monitor.
Before each test, instructions were given both verbally
and on the monitor to ensure that subjects understood
the procedure. For the study portion, participants were
presented with the 10 target items for 3 sec per item.
The 10 items were cycled through twice so that control
performance would be high enough to reveal impaired
performance. The target images were identical through-
out each task. During the test phase, participants were
presented with items one at a time and were asked to
respond whether an item was a target item (old) or a
nontarget item (new) as quickly as possible with a
mouse click. A total of 50 test items were presented
consisting of 20 target items (10 targets   2 presenta-
tions) and 30 nontargets (30 nontargets   1 presenta-
tion). The order of the stimuli remained the same for all
subjects so that test difficulty was the same for all
subjects. Subjects were tested in the same order, and
the testing was done on two different days. Day 1 in-
cluded houses, cars, Faces 1, and horses; Day 2 included
tools, Faces 2, natural landscapes, and guns.
APPENDIX
z Values of Average RT for DPs on Each Old/New
Discrimination
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Faces 1 Faces 2 Cars Houses Scenes Horses Tools Guns
F1  5.62  2.87  0.46  4.19  3.05  3.50 NA NA
F2  7.03  3.04  3.21  5.51  1.18  1.72  0.93  1.01
F3  2.63  1.24  1.27  1.02  1.18 NA  0.97 NA
F4 0.33  2.04  0.03  2.89  0.99  0.04  0.97 1.38
M1  4.37  5.93  2.01  3.55  2.95  3.89  2.96  2.16
M2  3.20  4.80  0.22  2.06  6.26  2.86  2.86  1.90
M3  1.92  8.21 0.09 0.43  0.24 0.20  0.23 0.21
Negative z values are produced by RTs that were longer than the
control mean, whereas positive z values are produced by RTs shorter
than the control mean. These values are displayed in Figure 5.
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